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From Colombia to the DRC exploring the untapped potential of restorative justice- A  
Response to Annette Pearson 
 
Sahla Aroussi 
Research Associate, Coventry University 
Introduction:  
 
This is a response to the notes from the field: “Is Restorative Justice a Piece in the Colombian 
Transitional Justice Puzzle?”. In these notes Annette Pearson looking at Colombia, asks a 
very valid question regarding the potential role that restorative justice can play in the 
Colombian transitional justice process. As an African specialist, when I was asked to write a 
response to Annette’s field notes, I was unsure about how my knowledge and experience of 
African conflicts and peace processes could be relevant to the Colombian context. Yet, 
reading the notes, made me reflect on my recent work on transitional justice in the east of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The complexity, messiness, fragmentation and 
politicisation of the Columbian process are also all too familiar.  
In this response, I will share some insights from the DRC context that draw on similar issues 
raised by Annette. In line with Annette’s notes I believe that restorative justice can similarly 
be a piece of the Congolese transitional justice puzzle.   
 
The Congolese peace agreements  
 
Similar to the Colombian case, the conflict in the DRC is complex. In 1996–1997 Laurent 
Kabila’s attempt to depose the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko led to the start of the Congo first 
war.  The fighting flared up after the Hutus genocidaires fled Rwanda to eastern Congo and 
were chased by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).  The spill-over from the conflict drew 14 
different countries from around the Great Lakes region and led to the extended presence in 
eastern Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan armies (Zongwe 2013). The Global and Inclusive 
Agreement of 2002 in Sun City that ended the Congo global wars, failed to stop the conflict in 
the east of the country and fighting resumed shortly after between the government and the 
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Rwanda backed Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)- later on transformed 
into the March 23 Mouvement, the Rwandan Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and many other armed groups 
(Stearns 2012). After the Sun City process, the DRC has seen several peace negotiations 
processes including the Goma Conferences in 2008; the Ihusi 2009 accords and the Kampala 
peace process in 2013. These processes have led to a revolving door approach to demobilisation 
and resulted in the fragmentation and factionalisation of armed groups (Verweijen and 
Wakenge 2015; Vlassenroot 2013; Stearns and Vogel 2015). Since 2009, various coordinated 
assaults have been undertaken by the Congolese government FARDC backed by the 
MONUSCO peacekeeping force resulting in the defeat of the M23 Mouvement and weakening 
the Rwandan Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF). However, the military actions by the Government and MONUSCO 
have failed to translate into significant gains in security and stability in the east of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UN Security Council Committee 1533 noted in 
December 2016 that the overall security situation in the east of Democratic Republic of the 
Congo has not improved and various national and internally linked armed groups continue to 
operate there.1 The absence of a vetting process for members of the army and the security forces 
has meant that these are often involved in crimes of various nature including rapes, exactions 
and pillage. In the east of the DRC, the lack of economic opportunities and absence of the rule 
of law have also meant increased criminal activities and lawlessness among civilians who are 
often involved in armed robberies, killings and rapes.   
The Congolese peace process and the legacy of the conflict 
 
The 2002 Global Peace Accord peace agreement included an amnesty provision that excluded 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity which formed the basis of the amnesty law 
No. 5/023 promulgated in 2005.2 The 2013 Nairobi peace agreement between the government 
and the M23 does not include any references to amnesty but also includes additional 
commitments to ensure that, “prosecution for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
                                                          
1 Sanction Committee 1533 report 28 December 2016. UN security Council Doc. S/2016/1102 available on  
Group of expert report http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1102  
2 République Démocratique du Congo: Loi No. 05/023 du 2005 portant amnistie pour faits de guerre, infractions 
politiques et d'opinion available at Refworld at  http://www.refworld.org/docid/47305d032.html  
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sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers are initiated against any presumed author 
thereof” and to exclude these crimes from amnesty.3  
To deal with issues of accountability for human rights and humanitarian law violations, 
following pressures from the international community, in April 2004, the DRC government 
self-referred the country- then already a signatory to the ICC since 2002- to the International 
Criminal Court. While, the ICC temporal jurisdiction was limited to crimes committed after its 
creation in 1 July 2002 by which time the DRC major wars were almost already over, this 
referral in addition to the adoption of article 215 of the DRC Constitution (2005), which 
provides a superior status to international treaties duly ratified by the DRC4 have meant that 
the door remained open for the ICC to pursue those responsible for future human rights and 
humanitarian violations in the DRC. In addition to the ICC referral, prosecutions in national 
military courts and tribunals including mobile courts have been pursued by the government and 
supported by donors. In the DRC, perhaps due to international heavy presence and 
involvement, there is an increasing focus on the prosecution of conflict related crimes as the 
way to deliver justice for survivors and particularly those involving the use of rape as a weapon 
on war. 
In addition to criminal prosecution, the Sun City Agreement established a National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission empowered to hear crimes and large-scale violations of human 
rights.5 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was established in 2004 failed to 
investigate a single case of human rights violations before the end of its mandate in 2006 
(Aroussi 2011; Davis and Hayner 2009). This Truth Commission included representatives of 
those armed groups known to have committed egregious human rights violations which was a 
clear impediment for establishing credibility and pursuing the accountability agenda. The 2013 
Nairobi agreement included a provision for establishing a new National Reconciliation and 
Justice Commission. This commission has not yet been established but doubts exist as to its 
independence and potential for delivering justice since it would be under the direct authority 
                                                          
3 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the end of the Kampala Talks 
Articles 1(1) and 8(4).  
4 Article 215 of the DRC 2005 Constitution provides “Lawfully concluded treaties and agreements have, when 
published, an authority superior to that of the law, subject for each treaty and agreement to the application by the 
other party”. 
5 The Global and Inclusive Agreement Sun City 16 December 2016, section V 
http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/global-and-inclusive-agreement-transition-dr-congo-inter-
congolese   
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of the president and prime minister. The Congolese peace agreements do not include any 
measures for the reparation of survivors.  
 
Failure of the current approach 
 
In the last few years, thanks to the organisation of mobile courts hearing and the support from 
donors in strengthening the capacity of the Congolese criminal justice system, we have seen a 
number of prosecution for crimes of international nature and particularly those involving 
sexual violence. For instance, in 2014, the DRC military tribunals convicted 135 individuals, 
including 76 members of the armed forces, 41members of the national police and 18 
members of armed groups, of war crimes. 6 At the level of the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
and Germain Katanga were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and the 
case of Mr Ntaganda is still on-going. Despite this, progress, in delivering justice for 
survivors of conflict related atrocities remains far from achieved. Most crimes in the east of 
the DRC remain never prosecuted or punished for lack of infrastructure, judicial and criminal 
justice capacity. The number of prosecutions in comparison to those of victims remain 
negligible. 
 In the east of the DRC, justice is remotely located and too expensive to be accessible for 
victims in rural communities. The Congolese justice system requires those seeking justice to 
pay fees for every step of the procedure from issuing the arrest warrant to getting a judgment. 
So far, prosecution rarely targeted the high ranking FARDC officers who continue to enjoy 
impunity (Aroussi 2016). Those convicted often escape from prison –if arrested at all- due to 
dilapidated prison conditions, poor security and corruption in prisons across the country 
(Aroussi 2016).  While compensation orders have been awarded by the court, they have never 
been paid to the victims for reason of destitution of the perpetrator, lack of States’ reparation 
fund and the complexity and cost of the procedure (Aroussi 2016).  
The prosecution efforts in the east of the DRC due to pressure from the international 
community has been so far focused on addressing crimes against international law committed 
by armed groups and particularly rape as a weapon of war. Yet, as mentioned earlier many of 
the crimes in the east of the DRC are committed by civilians and criminal gangs. Responding 
                                                          
6 UN Secretary General Report on Conflict Related Sexual Violence 23 March 2015 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/203  
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to atrocities that occurred during two decades of conflicts necessarily requires a broader 
framework that gives equal access to justice for those who have experienced violations that 
do not amount to crimes of international nature and crimes that do not involve sexual 
violence such as summary execution, damages to properties and the looting of assets. 
Delivering justice to these victims is complex, in terms of legal framework, mechanisms and 
priorities.  
Restorative justice potential contribution to the Congolese process 
 
Similar to Colombia, in the DRC, the restorative justice potential for dealing with the legacy 
of the conflict has not been fully utilised. So far, the prosecution efforts have failed to deliver 
justice to the large number of victims.  In the east, impunity remains the norm rather than the 
exception. The failure of the demobilisation and security sector reform processes has meant 
that many of the perpetrators are now members of the army and security forces and continue 
to enjoy impunity and pray on the local population. The non-execution of sentences has also 
meant that those who are convicted continue to room free in total impunity. Reparation orders 
against perpetrators are almost never executed even when the government is condemned in 
Solidum. The lack of commitments from the Congolese government to execute judgments 
and pay for the reparation orders to survivors has meant that all the international 
communities’ efforts in improving the capacity of the Congolese criminal justice system to 
prosecute did not have any positive impact on survivors on the ground.  
In eastern DRC, criminal prosecutions have little cultural resonance among the rural 
communities who continue to use the traditional justice system and particularly friendly 
agreements arranged at the level of the customary chief. Most of the population in the rural 
areas are unable and unwilling to access the criminal justice system due to issues of 
remoteness, complexity of the procedure and unaffordability (Aroussi 2016). In the east, the 
practice of delivering justice necessarily involves reparative and restorative measures that are 
at the heart of victims’ perceptions of what justice is.  As such in the east of the DRC, 
restorative justice can arguably play an important role in delivering a form of justice that is 
both meaningful and accessible to the victims.  Since the Congolese peace agreements 
allowed for the establishment of truth commissions, it would be of utmost importance that a 
restorative process for eastern Congo is set up.  
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